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ments. One may either maintain a liberal arts
program or not. (2) Would-be professional practitioners in the correctional field should seek

graduate training in a school of social work or in
a bonafide, graduate department of corrections
which includes therapeutic training.

BOOK REVIEWS

Edited by
C. R. Jeffery*
PsYycuTmxc JUsTIcE. By Thomas S. Szasz, M.D.

New York: Macmillan Company, 1965. pp. 283.
$6.95.
Tradition, judges, and lawyers generally assume
two basic tenets concerning the competency of an
accused to stand trial: (1) a person whose mental
condit on prevents him from effectively assisting in
his defiense should not be put to trial; (2) the determination of an accused's mental condition
should initially be submitted to psychiatrists. Accordingly, statutes and rules exist in nearly every
American jurisdiction to allow pre-trial psychiatric
examinations where either the defense, the prosecution, or the court have any question as to the
ability of the accused to stand trial. In Psychiatric
Justice, Thomas S. Szasz, M.D., a professor of
psychiatry at the State University of New York
Upstate Medical College, furiously blasts away at
this fortress of orthodoxy. When the blood and
thunder of his frontal assault has subsided, the
edifice, though slightly shaken, is left standing.
As far back as 1859 John Stuart Mill bemoaned
the "contemptible and frightful" evidence with
which a person could be judicially declared unfit to
manage his affairs.' From Dr. Szasz's point of
view, things have done nothing but deteriorate in
the intervening 106 years. The characteristic terror
of our times, Szasz contends, is that we are denying
the constitutional right to trial by means of a
sophisticated and insidious alliance between psychiatry and law. We examine a defendant, decide
he is incompetent, and incarcerate him in a mental
institution without ever bringing him to trial for
the crime with which he was originally charged.
* Institute for Behavioral Research, The Washington School of Psychiatry, 1610 New Hampshire Ave.,
N.W., Washington 9, D. C.
IMIML, ON LIBERTY, Chapter 3, nt. 1.

Where did we go wrong? With almost child-like
simplicity, Szasz tells us we abandoned liberty
when we let psychiatrists and psychologists have
a voice in determining who is competent to stand
trial. To reform, he urges us to drive the behavioral
scientists out of the courthouse. All they can give
us, at best, is a tenuous psychiatric diagnostic
label for the person examined, i.e., sociopath,
schizophrenic, paranoid. Szasz believes that "there
is neither logical nor factual connection between
mental illness and the ability to perform the task
required of a defendant." Thus "describing a
defendant whose competence to stand trial is in
question as 'mentally sick' is either irrelevant (like
calling him 'slightly obese'), or destructive (like
calling him a 'Communist swine.')" Hence Szasz's
basic objective: defrock psychiatrists as arbiters
of who is competent to stand trial. His solution:
replace them by experienced lawyers, unfettered
by psychiatric training and jargon, who will simply
talk to the defendant to see if he can assist in his
defense 2
Lovers and madmen have such seething
brains,
Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend
More than cool reason ever comprehends.
The lunatic, the lover, and the poet
Are of imagination all compact;
One sees more devils than vast hell can hold,
That is the madman: the lover, all as frantic,
Sees Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt:
The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth
to heaven;
2The medicine man and his herbs gave way to the
psychiatrist and his analysis. Now both give way to
the lawyer and his bag of common sense. This is
progress, after a fashion, but in reverse.
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And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy
nothing
A local habitation and a name.
-A Midsummer Night's Dream,
Act V, Sc. 1
No madman or lover, but deadly earnest poet
is Szasz. In 272 passionately and clearly written
pages he furnishes several sparkling examples of
metaphor run rampant. Some examples: "To be
called mentally ill is like being called a Negro in
Alabama or a Jew in Nazi Germany-or to be
called schizophrenic in a courtroom." What is
mental illness? "....

[A] dirty word that is pinned

on people, in order to incriminate them, to get
them." The modern state is using "psychiatry as a
weapon against the individual citizen." We are
losing hard-earned freedoms through "stiffening
psychiatric-social controls."
Does Szasz believe that the mental disorder
known as schizophrenia exists? "Not otherwise
than as ink marks on a piece of paper. It is a name.
But that the disease exists, no, I don't believe it."
To use the word beyond the privileged confines of
a doctor's office-worst of all, in a courtroom-is
to render "terrible social consequences" to the
victim. Agreed, but what about the consequences
to society attendant upon the release of mentally
disabled persons?
Szasz reserves his greatest wrath and hyperbole
for the idea of causing a defendant to be examined
by psychiatrists prior to trial. "....

[Mierely be-

cause of a 'suspicion' about the defendant's mental
state, he is removed from the category of an ordinary human being, with whom judges can converse
-and is placed in the category of the insane, who,
having been demoted from person to patient, must
be examined by psychiatrists. In this way, and at a
single stroke, the whole procedure of determining
competence to stand trial is rendered irrational, is
debased morally, and is transformed into an instrument of violence against the defendant." The
attempt of the prosecution to make this examination appear cooperative, though performed by
"agents of the state", is "simply a strategic
maneuver by the government to render its opponent impotent. It is a symptom of despotism-of
the worst kind." What happens to the concept of
the trial as an adversary proceeding when the defendant is committed as an incompetent? "No
longer a rational and fair contest between two
spiritually equal adversaries, it is a grotesque
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nightmare, in which a proud and strong man (the
state) crushed a tiny and repulsive insect (the
accused)."
In order to understand why Szasz wants to drive
the psychiatrists and all their pomps from the
halls of justice, we must recognize the cornerstone
of his fundamentalist anti-psychiatric philosophy:
"....

involuntary mental hospitalization, civil or

criminal, has no place in a civilized, free society
and must be abolished." To answer this naive contention with an ad terrarem appeal would be easy
but unnecessary. We all know, sadly enough, the
harm certain mentally disabled persons would
cause others and themselves were they not involuntarily hospitalized.
Dr. Szasz's fear of engaging in what he calls the
psychiatric "prosecution" of persons for "mental
illness" has led him to refuse to conduct pre-trial
psychiatric examinations-he has made less than
four in 15 years of practice. Portions of two of his
testimonial encounters are set forth in iaec verba
in the book, the "Louis Perroni" and "Abraham
Hoffer" cases. The names of the defendants are
pseudonyms; the trials actually occurred.
"Perroni," a Syracuse, New York filling station
operator who fired a warning shot at men who
came to place a sign on his property after it had
been legally condemned for a real estate development, was found incompetent to stand trial by two
court-appointed psychiatrists and sent to Matteawan State Hospital. Six years later, his writ of
habeas corpus was granted and he was returned
to stand trial in Syracuse. Szasz examined him,
determined that he was competent, and testified at
a second competency hearing after which "Peroni"
was again found incompetent and returned to
Matteawan. During the hearing this colloquy took
place:
Q. What do you look for, Doctor, in determining whether a man is able to stand trial, or assist
his counsel in defending the charges against him
on a criminal charge?
A. Maybe to me psychiatry is simpler than to
some people, but I just like to ascertain whether
he can talk to me reasonable, like anyone else,
whether he is mentally dear and rational.
This is, of course, the reason why Szasz wants
to give the job of determining competency to those
wonderfully gifted common sense men, the lawyers,
and get it away from the mystifications and
abstrusities of psychiatrists.
In Szasz's second competency hearing, the defendant Hoffer was charged with kidnapping and
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sexually abusing two young girls. He had previously been discharged from the Army as a schizophrenic, and, after pre-trial psychiatric examinations was found incompetent and sent to Matteawan. Szasz testified for him in a habeas corpus
proceeding, but he was re-committed. Subsequently, Hoffer was restored and pleaded guilty
for time already served-a fact that, for Szasz,
manifests the basic unfairness of the proceedings.
Two other transcripts are presented in the bookthe pre-trial competency hearing of Major General
Edwin A. Walker, which ended in a finding of
competency (a Mississippi federal Grand Jury
later on billed Walker on charges arising out of the
riots on the University of Mississippi campus
when James Meredith enrolled), and the District
of Columbia competency proceeding involving
Frederick Lynch. 3 With some effectiveness, Szasz
uses the Lynch case to typify the horror of the plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity induced by the
Government-"the single most terrible manifestation of evangelistic psychiatry riding roughshod
over civil liberties and human dignity."
It is extremely important to emphasize that the
scope of Psychiatric Justice is limited to pre-trial
competency examinations requested by the court or
the prosecttion. Szasz writes: "It is unusual for a
defendant to plead mental incompetence to stand
trial, and for good reason: doing so would be more
likely to harm him than help him. I shall therefore
not discuss this situation." He contends that "in
the vast majority of these cases, it is not the
defendant or his agents who raise this issue, but
the prosecution or the court." Szasz's experience,
however, may be atypical. For example, in Cook
County, Illinois, for the year 1964, 59% of the 374
defendants examined by the Behavior Clinic were
examined at the request of the defense. Moreover,
Illinois has had a number of defendants who, after
trial and conviction, have claimed on appeal that
the trial court erred in not conducting a pre-trial
sanity hearing for them. 4 And defendants can gain
from a plea of mental incompetence. Where the
defense will be insanity at the time of the crime,
that defense is materially aided by a temporary
pre-trial commitment of the accused. When he is
returned for trial, the defense may profitably argue
that the disabling condition in existence at the

time of the pre-trial commitment was in existence
at the time of the crime.
As we all know and should never forget, psychiatry is an inexact science. Szasz's value is that
he provocatively reminds us of psychiatry's diagnostic limitations, which are often severe, and
he justifiably frightens us about the defendants
who are wrongfully detained in a mental hospital
against their will. Mistakes have been made and
nothing on earth can erase the harm they bring to
the victim. Yet they have been mistakes caused by
the fallability of psychiatrists-a fallability shared
by all other humans-and not by any demoniacal
machinations. To remove psychiatrists from
participating in the determination of competency
to stand trial would be to throw the baby out with
the bath water. The sad fact of the matter is that
imperfect as psychiatrists are as arbiters of a
person's competency, they are more able for the
task than lawyers and judges. What psychiatrists
do not know about the practicalities of assisting in
the defense of a criminal case is not as significant
as what lawyers and judges do not know about
psychoses and neuroses.
After all, the marriage between law and psychiatry never has and never will be completely
happy. It was a shotgun wedding between two
frequently incompatible partners. But like all
shotgun weddings, it was necessary, and, for that
reason, should endure.
WILLr&M J. MARTIN
Assistant State's Attorney
Cook County (Chicago), Illinois

CASES ON CMaNAL LAW. By Turner and Arinitage. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 3d ed. 1964. pp. 664. $12.00.
Messrs. Turner and Armitage have produced a
second revision of their work keyed to KENNI's
OUrLINES OF CnnNAL LAW. In this, their third
edition of Professor Kenny's landmark casebook,
the two Cambridge professors have continued the
general approach of their earlier versions by not
including any "materials" or supplementary
information in their case-by-case diet of British
criminal law. The validity of this practice, traditional in British casebook compilation, has been
discussed in the reviews of the two earlier editions
of the volume in the Journal.* Except to say
that the tie-in with KENNY's OUTLINES in part
3 See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705.
suffices for the lack of non-judicial information,
4 See People v. Wilson, 29 Il1. 2d 88, 92-94; People v.
*44 J. C=xn. L., C.&P.S.493(1953); 50 J. Cslm.
Pickett, 28 Ill. 2d 92, 93-94; People v. Foley, 28 Ill.
2d 426, 427-428; Withers v. People, 23 D1. 2d 131, 135. L., C. &P.S.167(1959).
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further evaluation at the time would tend to be
superfluous.
In addition to the usual updating and elimination of "old material," the new version of CASES
ON CnnsnNAL LAW differs from earlier editions in
three respects. The casebook, which now constitutes the first volume of the new Cambridge
Legal Case Book series, will also appear in paperback form, thereby facilitating its availability to
students. In addition, all the cases dealing with the
law of evidence related to criminal law have been
deleted.
As was pointed out by Professor G. 0. W.
Mueller in his review of the first edition of this
volume, the inclusion of the law of criminal evidence is much to be desired. It brings greater
comprehension to the student attempting to
master the discipline, and proportionately mitigates the extensive amount of material to be
covered in the regular course on evidence. It is
much regretted if their deletion in the present
edition represents the fact that the authors have
yielded in this effort.
The authors appear to have made it a point to
include two decisions that were announced after
their "cut-off" date of October, 1963. Since such
attempts are always an inconvenience to all parties
involved in the process of publication, the decisions must hold particular significance to Messrs.
Turner and Armitage, and thereby justify some
mention at this time.
On May 10, 1963, one Vincent King visited the
home of his mother-in-law, who was alone with his
five months old son. During the next two hours,
his two sisters-in-law, on separate occasions, left
a school bus a short distance from the house. The
girls, ages eleven and twelve, the child and the
mother-in-law were all killed by defendant King.
The British Homicide Act of 1957 eliminated
capital punishment for almost all criminal acts.
One exception to this elimination of the "ultimate
penalty" is when the defendant commits murders
on different occasions. Since a delivery boy had
found no one at the home prior to the time the
second schoolgirl left the bus, the question arose as
to whether the four homicidal acts were one or
more "occasions" under the statute. Judge McNair, sitting in the Kent Assizes, declared that
the facts in the case did not indicate that any of
the killings took place on separate occasions, as he
construed the statute. Thus, for purposes of the
statute, he viewed the "criminal situation" as a
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whole and in a manner similar to the continental
civil law judges' approach to criminal cases and not
under the traditional "specific act" evaluation of
common law criminal jurisprudence.
One would think that the Labor Government's
recent Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill,
which was introduced and consistently encouraged
by Mr. Sydney Silverman, M.P., would obviate
the need for insuring that this case was included by
the authors. For the Bill, which would eliminate
the few remaining instances when capital punishment may be imposed, received an unprecedented
majority of 185 votes (355-170) as well as the firm
support of the Home Secretary, Mr. Henry Brooke,
at its second reading in the House of Commons on
December 21, 1964. Time, however, has justified
the wisdom (or luck) of the authors, as the Bill
received a major set-back on March 5, 1965, and
has become a minor "political football". Thus the
death penalty, and the validity of Regina v. King,
remains at this writing.
The second case specifically included was before
Lord Parker in the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Defendant, also named King, believing himself to
be divorced from wife No. 1, married wife No. 2.
Upon subsequently learning that he was still
married to wife No. 1 at the time of the second
marriage, but that the first marriage was now
dissolved, he married wife No. 3, believing that
the marriage to wife No. 2 was not valid.
Mr. King's trial for bigamy resulted from the
fact that his first marriage had indeed been dissolved before and not after he married wife No. 2.
His defense was his honest belief that he was freemistake of fact-and, therefore, lack of mens rea.
The trial court ruled this was no defense. Lord
Parker felt that this was incorrect, that honest
belief on reasonable grounds would be a valid defense. Defendant King, however, offered no evidence to prove he had such reasonable grounds, so
his conviction was upheld, much to the chagrin
(or pleasure) of his many wives, past and present.
CASES ON CRIMNAL LAW remains a valuable
tool to the serious scholar who wishes a quick, yet
comprehensive reference to how our British
cousins deal with their problems in the criminal
courts.
ALLEN SULTAN

School of Law
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana
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PREPARATORY DRAFT FOR THE REVISED PENAL

1961 With an Introduction by
Juhei Kakeucii Guest Editor B. J. George, Jr.
(The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, 8,
Editor-in-Chief Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, Comparative Criminal Law Project, New York
University, School of Law), South Hackensack,
N.J., 1964
There has been considerable growth, during the
last ten-fifteen years, in American interest in
foreign criminal law. The series of foreign penal
codes, of which the volume under review is the
eighth, is both a result of this, and a factor stimulating further growth. Compared with the situation
in the German and French speaking parts of the
world, with the impressive Sarnnlung asserdeutscher Strafgesetzbiidher, started in 1881 and numbering 85 volumes now, and the French Les Codes
Penau .Europeens,the American Series of Foreign
Penal Codes was long overdue, and we owe a debt
of gratitude to the Comparative Criminal Law
Project and its director Professor Gerhard 0. W.
Mueller for their efforts to fill this gap, and for the
speed with which they proceed.
The Draft Penal Code of Japan, completed in
1961, is not a revolutionary departure. In his
Introduction, the chief draftsman, Dr. Takeuchi,
Director of the Preparatory Commission for the
Revision of the Penal Code, points out that "the
Preparatory Draft preserves basic assumptions
underlying the provisions of the Penal Code, and
is merely intended to develop or refine some of
them and to limit the applicability of others" (pp.
2-3).
CODE OF JAPAN

This statement illustrates an important aspect of the
institution of codification itself. Codification, one
might say, is a building in which a particular branch of
the law of a country is housed. With the lapse of time
some rooms are not inhabited anymore, while new
parts of the law are housed in temporary structures
clustered around the main building. When the manager
of the building (the legislator) concludes that the situation is getting out of hand and needs correcting, he will
remodel his building, evict some of the tenants and
assign others to new quarters, build new annexes and
pull down the sheds and shanties that have mushroomed
around the building. The frequency of this procedure is
determined by the potentialities of the building, the
arrival and departure of the tenants, and the moods of
the manager. France still has its Criminal Code of 1810,
while Russia had at least six major recodifications of
its penal law since then (1845, 1885, 1903, 1922, 1926
and 1960).

In its basic goal-orientation the Draft is conservative. Without explicitly stating its views on
the aims of punishment and penal policy, the
Draft appears to embrace the principle of culpability and retribution, of repression and reformation, and of the humane character of penalties. In Japanese legal tradition, according to Dr.
Takeuchi, priority is given to the principle of
culpability coupled to retribution.
The retributive aspect of punishing has been the
subject of harsh criticism during the last decades.
It has been argued that retribution serves no useful purpose, since it does not contribute towards
the rehabilitation of the offender; its deterrent
effect is very questionable (with regard to the offender, as well as to the population at large); it
only satisfies an instinct of social vengeance; in
short-it is irrational.
There is much truth in these arguments, but not
enough, I think. This review is not the most suitable
place for a discussion of the principles of criminal
policy, but at least I would say that it seems to me that
a solution of the difficulties in this matter must not be
sought in abandoning the principle of retribution, but
rather in an effort to make retribution rational to a
maximum extent. The other road, I am convinced, will
lead to the end of criminal law, which would be replaced
by some kind of correctional-administrative law. (It is
worth noticing that the Soviet Union, where a system
of 'measures of social defense' against 'socially dangerous actions' was in operation for some years, has long
since returned to 'classic' criminal law.) What is
worse, however, I believe that a development which
would abandon the notions of culpability (guilt) and
retribution would ultimately result in the de-humanization of the processes which are now governed, be it
imperfectly, by criminal law.
The Japanese Draft seems to show us a way out
of the impasse, by coupling the idea of retribution
to the idea of culpability. This means that the idea
of retribution must be strictly divorced from the
idea of commensurateness between act and punishment. The days of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
tooth, have passed forever, although some vestiges
still linger on in various jurisdictions in the institution of strict liability.
The new insights into the working of the human
mind and psyche and into the social dimensions of
human conduct, acquired by the modem anthropological sciences, should serve, not to throw responsibility and criminal law overboard, but to
give more meaning, depth and reality to responsibility, and, consequently, to culpability.

BOOK REVIEWS

In this light we might see Dr. Takeuchi's remark "that as scientific knowledge of the human
mind advances, factors reducing blameworthiness
are more likely to be found than those aggravating
it. No one can be wholly blamed for his illegal acts,
because his exercise of free will is always limited
for a variety of reasons" (p. 4).
This, in turn, is going to lead to a decreasing
severity of penal sanctions. In this respect there is
great divergence in the world. In some civilized
countries the law provides, and the courts impose,
penalties that are considered nothing less than
barbaric in other civilized countries. The question
is not: who is right? (since every country has the
legal system it deserves, reflecting the cultural
level and the value scales of the society in which it
operates), but: who represents a more advanced
stage of civilization?
Gustav Radbruch remarks in his autobiography that
our generation, with the advance of civilization, is
becoming more sensitive to pain and suffering, and less
able to bear them. Life in the Middle Ages appears
impossibly harsh to a person living in this century (at
least in our kind of society), but people in the fourteenth
century had different ideas. To them torture, mutilation and the infliction of slow and painful death
were perfectly fair and acceptable; in fact contemporary
sources show that even the culprit (we would call him
the victim) usually accepted his lot as a quite natural
and Christian event.
At present, I think, the main task which confronts penal policy is the humanization of punishment (involving an increased individualization of
penalties and, as a rule, more lenient penalties). In
order to achieve this we have to make an effort to
arouse society and destroy its equanimity towards
inhumane forms of punishment. If this effort is not
made, and had not been made in the past, we would
still have torture.
The reader may forgive this excursion about the
instrumentalities of progress in penal policy. It is
important to be aware of the function of ideas in this
process. Compared to the wide discretionary powers,
and the arbitrary use thereof by the medieval judge,
the emergence of strict liability (a fixed penalty for a
particular offense) was a progressive development,
although at present the instances of strict liability are
rather to be seen as anachronisms.
The picture is not very different with regard to the
principle of legality. This, to be sure, has been a most
potent factor of progress during the last two centuries
and in many countries it continues to be this. Nevertheless, if it is overemphasized and exaggerated, the
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legality principle can be an obstacle on the road towards
the individualization of punishment and the humanization of penal law. It is, for instance, no coincidence that
the penalties imposed by the courts in Anglo-American
jurisdictions, where the procedural position of the
defendant is perhaps better safeguarded than on the
continent, often appear somewhat ferocious to continental lawyers.
When we begin now to look at the Draft itself,
the first thing that strikes us is the absence of a
statement of the principle indium crimen sine lege.
One may argue, of course, that this would be
superfluous, the principle being firmly embodied in
Japanese legal tradition, but still such a statement
is a popular, and not altogether illogical, beginning
of a penal code.
The first chapter is named 'Application of the
Penal Code' and it regulates such questions as
crimes committed abroad, crimes committed by
foreigners, retroactivity of a new penal law only
where it is to the advantage of the accused, etc.
Art. 4 provides that any person, whether Japanese or
alien, shall be punishable for the crimes enumerated in
this article (piracy, counterfeiting, opium-crimes, etc.).
Art. 2 provides that the Code shall apply to Japanese
nationals who outside Japan commit a crime punishable by imprisonment for a maximum term of five years
or any heavier punishment. Art. 5 contains an identical
rule concerning aliens who commit outside Japan a
crime against the Japanese state or against a Japanese
citizen (provided the act is criminal under the law of the
place of the offense). I wonder whether it would not
have been possible to make one provision out of these
three; especially Art. 5, as it is, has the appearance of
being an afterthought of Art. 4.
A provision I cannot admire very much is Art. 18
("Acts done without a mind to commit a crime are
not punishable: Provided, that this shall not apply
where otherwise specially provided by law"). The
heading of the provision is 'Criminal intent', so I
suppose that what the article really means is
"Crimes committed through negligence are
punishable only in cases especially provided by
law".
Arts. 19 and 20 perpetuate the traditional
distinction between ignorance of law and ignorance
of fact. Not denying the possibility of making the
distinction, I would seriously question its usefulness in criminal law. For the criminal, at the
moment he commits the crime, the existence of a
law which forbids the crime is a fact he knows or
does not know. Similarly, the court, in deciding on
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the issues of guilt and punishment, is called upon
to face and resolve a factual situation, one of the
elements of which is the existence of specific rules
of criminal law. The Japanese Draft has attached
different consequences to the two kinds of ignorance. Ignorance of fact precludes criminal intent,
"ignorance of law shall not mean the absence of
intent". However, I believe that the latter rule is
inconsistent with the stress placed on culpability
by the Draft. Ignorance of law does imply the
absence of intent, the rule stated by the Draft is
merely a legal fiction. Of course, all but a very few
mentally abnormal individuals know that murder,
theft, rape, etc. are forbidden and punished in our
society, although they may be ignorant of the legal
definition of such offenses. But I think that in the
ever-growing field of offenses of an administrative
nature (e.g. against tax law) the citizen should be
protected against the presumption of knowledge of
the law.
My views are vindicated, it seems to me, by the
following provision (Art. 21), which says: "If aggravated punishment is prescribed on the basis of
the results of a crime, but it was impossible to
foresee such results, such aggravated punishment
cannot be imposed." This rule is a clear and commendable consequence of the culpability principle.
In Art. 22 the Draft provides (paragraph 2): "An
attempt is punishable only when specifically so
provided." This practice is not new (it is used, for
instance, in the German Penal Code), and it
results in a rather unnecessary increase in the size
of the Code. There seem to be two alternatives: (a)
the Code enumerates in one provision all cases of
punishable attempts, and (b) the Code leaves it to
the courts not to punish insignificant cases of
attempts. The Japanese Draft suffers an extra increase by a great number of provisions which forbid preparation and conspiracy to commit specific
crimes. I think that in this case too one might
apply one of the solutions suggested above.
Punishment of attempt may be, but need not be,
reduced (Art. 22 paragraph 3). The reason for this
is, apparently, that an attempted crime can still
show a high degree of culpability. Similarly, coprincipals and instigators are treated as principals,
whereas punishment for an accessory shall be reduced (Arts. 26-28). This leaves the court free to
impose a penalty which will reflect the degree of
involvement of the accessory.
The same principle is enunciated in the chief rule
governing the imposition of punishment (Art.
47 paragraph 1): "Punishment shall be assessed

commensurate with the culpability of the offender."
Where the law orders a reduction of punishment
it generally means a reduction of 50%; capital
punishment in such cases is commuted to a life
sentence, and a life sentence to a sentence of at
least seven years (Art. 53).
An increase of the maximum term of punishment is allowed in cases of recidivism (Art. 60). A
person who has committed a crime punishable by
imprisonment after having been sentenced before
to imprisonment for six months or more, may be
found an habitual recidivist by the court and be
given an indeterminate sentence (Arts. 61 and 62).
The chapters X and XI of the General Part of the
Draft regulate two related institutions: suspension of
the execution of the sentence and suspension of the
pronouncement of the sentence (to me it would seem
more logical to deal with the suspended pronouncement
first).
Parole is dealt with in chapter XII. It may be
granted after the offender has served one third of
his term, which is a very lenient arrangement.
In chapter XIV, which deals with prescription, I
have been puzzled by Art. 102, which says, among
other things, that the prescription of prosecution shall
be tolled while the institution of prosecution is without
validity because the offender has concealed himself.
Why should the institution of prosecution against an
absconding offender be without validity?
In the second part of the Draft Code, devoted to
the specific crimes, we miss a chapter concerning
crimes against the Imperial House. The present
Japanese Penal Code, and most penal codes of
European monarchies, contain such a chapter.
Neither are there any specific rules concerning war
crimes, crimes against peace and genocide.
The special part of a penal code is usually more
revealing in respect to national and ethnic particularities than the more dogmatic general part.
Unfamiliar with the cultural, economic and social
backgrounds of Japanese criminal law, I can
merely note some of the rules which appear in some
way significant in this respect.
There are very elaborate provisions concerning
the bribery of officials and crimes connected with
public elections. There are also chapters in the
special part which deal with water pollution and
opium-smoking respectively. Two statutes concerning the use of explosives overlap to a great
extent (Arts. 186 and 198). (This, I think, is a
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thing to be avoided in a penal code, in view of the
special difficulties in applying the provisions concerning accumulative crimes.) Art. 259 makes it an
offense to mutilate, destroy, abandon, conceal or
take possession of a corpse, of the ashes or a lock
of hair of a dead person or anything placed in a
coffin, or to subject a corpse to indignities.
A provision which is not quite clear to me is Art. 263,
which goes under the heading 'pandering'. Its first
paragraph says: "A person who for purposes of gain
induces a woman not of a promiscuous character to
have sexual intercourse shall be punished.

.

.". This

provision prompts the following questions: who is
supposed to gain in this case (the panderer, the woman,
or both), why are women of a promiscuous character
excluded, and with whom is the woman supposed to
have intercourse (with the panderer or with a third
person)?
The Japanese Draft forbids any kind of gambling (in chapter XXIII), including gambling itself
(except for or with something without intrinsic
value), opening a gambling place, organizing
gambling, and the issuing, sale, transfer or receiving
of lottery tickets (Arts. 265-267).
Other rules which to an outsider appear to be
connected with particular Japanese conditions, the
exact nature of which cannot be grasped by reading
the scant statements of the Penal Code, are Art.
322 ("A person who without good reason forcibly
demands an interview with... another. . .") and

Art. 323 ("A person who.., by subjection to
embarrassment makes another perform an act
which he is under no duty to perform...").
I have already mentioned several provisions
which do not seem quite clear. For a reader (such
as this reviewer) who is not familiar with the
language of the original it is impossible to put the
blame for vague wording on either the draftsmen
or the translators (assuming that the reader's own
lack of perspicacity is not to be blamed).
On another point the translators have assumed
full responsibility. As they (Professor B. J. George
Jr. and Mr. Yoshio Suzuki) put it in their preface:
"We have tried wherever possible to avoid using
terms with a technical common law meaning, for
fear that they might cause the English-speaking
reader to reach a hasty and erroneous conclusion as
to the concept intended to be conveyed in both the
original and the translation." Personally I agree
with this point of view, provided the translation
remains readable and understandable. On the
other band, it seems that in Great Britain there is
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a tendency to stress elegance rather than exactitude in a legal translation, or perhaps I should say
that there is less tolerance in admitting new terms
and more rigidity in adhering to the traditional
legal jargon.
Nevertheless, with the growth of international
relations and the concomitant rapprochement between the continental and Anglo-American legal
systems (of which the Model Penal Code is an
eloquent example), there is a growing need for
English equivalents of continental legal terms.
Until now the terminology employed by the
American Series of Foreign Penal Codes has not
been entirely uniform (I am referring mostly to the
general parts of the codes). If the reviewer may
assume the cloak of the fairy god-mother, instead
of the critical neighbor's wife, and be allowed to
utter a wish at the cradle of this new creature, it
would be that the Comparative Criminal Law
Project, which has rendered such valuable service
in producing this series, would also take the lead
in piloting us through the difficult waters of
continental legal terminology.
Russian Research Center F. J. M. FELDBRUGGE
Cambridge, Massachusetts

CRE, CORRECTION AND SoCrTY. By Elmer H.
Johnson. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press,
_rNoLoGY. By
1964, pp. xv, 792. $11.35. C
Donald R. Taft and Ralph W. England, Jr. The
MacMillan Company, 4th ed. 1964, pp. 552.
$6.95.
Both of these texts are written from a sociological perspective. They seek the explanation of
criminal behavior in the characteristics of the
social structure rather than in the peculiarities of
the offender's personality. Johnson tends to emphasize the search for reasons why certain individuals break the law and others do not. Taft
and England are more interested in the origin of
patterns of criminal behavior.
The texts differ more in style and organization
than in substance. The Taft and England text is
an excellent book, well written, with a judicious
and clear coverage of the main etiological theories
and penological developments and philosophies.
It leaves the reader with the feeling that he has
acquired a perspective on the whole field of criminology. It should be a popular text with the students.
The Johnson text is more difficult to assess. It
is in the form of a carefully organized annotated
bibliography rather than a book with an inte-
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grated philosophical approach. This of course is
a reflection of research in a field that is multidisciplinary and lacking in philosophical consensus. Perhaps its weakest point is its lack of
selectivity. The dependence upon and lack of
modification of the philosophies and varied behavioral science viewpoints of summarized studies
makes for an evident eclecticism.
However, Johnson in applying the conceptualizations and theoretical insights of general sociology
to the field of criminology has introduced some
fresh vistas. As Johnson writes in his conclusion:
"Criminology is in a state of unusual ferment, making our presentation the equivalent
of a photograph which artificially freezes one
moment of a dynamic crowd scene. The dynamism of criminological phenomena is confusing to persons seeking pat, final and simple
solutions. But dynamism is characteristic of
the answers revealed by scientific studies
because new questions are raised in the course
of determining answers to questions previously asked."
Johnson's book might be thought of as an
instructor's text, because while there is reference
to most standard works in the field, he has incorporated and summarized a large number of
research articles from the journals of criminology
and corrections not ordinarily included. Since the
book was written for both college courses and inservice training "for agency personnel involved in
applied criminology", the approach to the field
of corrections is a practical one. It begins where
current practice and assumptions are and introduces research studies that tend to modify them
in the direction of the sociological approach and
the new penology.
The seven hundred and sixty-nine pages and
twenty-six chapters of Johnson's text are divided
into five parts: Crime and the Criminal; Crime
Causation; Society Reacts to Criminals; Confinement and Correction; and, the Offender and the
Community. A little over a quarter of the book is
devoted to crime causation and approximately
similar amounts of space are assigned to both
society's reaction to the criminal, dealing with the
administration of justice, and to confinement and
correction.
Taft and England's five hundred and thirtyfive pages and twenty-nine chapters are divided
into three sections: the Background of Criminal
Behavior; the Explanation of Crime; and, the
Treatment of Offenders. More than one third of the

book is taken up with a critical discussion of the
various theories purporting to explain crime. The
authors go to some lengths to present fairly the
research of those that do not agree with their
general philosophy. The theory is presented sympathetically and then followed by conciliatory
statements of possible shortcomings in the approach presented. This is particularly true in the
case of the Gluecks and Kinsey. This is also shown
in the burden of proof placed on the "Extremists
of the 'pro-Negro' group" to prove that biological
factors play no part in the behavior of Negroes.
Usually the burdon of proof rests with the affirmative. A sixth of the text is devoted to the
administration of justice and a slight third to the
treatment of offenders.
The rest of this review will compare the two
texts along the main divisional lines of the causes
of crime, the administration of justice, and the
treatment of offenders.
In general Taft and England cover in a comprehensive and satisfying way the accepted approach to the etiology of crime. They de-emphasize
the historical schools of criminology but cover the
Neo-Lombrosian approaches and emphasize the
work of the Gluecks and the findings based upon
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. They include a generally well rounded
chapter on the Negro and Crime and chapters on
economic influences on crime, the influences of the
family in which the psycho-analytic theories are
treated in some detail, the ecology of crime with a
de-emphasis on regional differences, the juvenile
gang, organized crime, the mass media and religion. A considerable amount of space is allocated
to alcoholism, drug addiction and sex crimes, including a large section on prostitution. A chapter
entitled "A Theory of Crime" concludes this section.
The preceding chapters are unusually well integrated under the thesis that crime in the United
States is a normal consequence of the nature of
American society and its prevalence and characteristic nature are explainable in terms of that
culture. The chapter is somewhat anticlimactic,
however, and points up what is perhaps the most
serious flaw in the text-the lack of emphasis on
the mechanisms through which criminal behavior
is acquired by the individual law violator. Furthermore, the origin of particular patterns of crime in
the structure and processes of American society is
only vaguely suggested.
Taft and England concluded:
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"...we reviewed the principal approaches
having in common the notion that crime is
fundamentally symptomatic of individual
peculiarities and abnormalities. In rejecting
this notion we contend, as would most sociologists, that much crime-and certainly
most crime for gain-is ordered social behavior, having characteristic norms, attitudes, values and techniques. The individual
offender may modify these to a limited extent
according to his imagination, intelligence,
and the exigencies of his situation, but the
general outlines of criminal ways persist over
time as discernable patterns."
Turning to Johnson's treatment of the causes of
crime, we read:
"Sociology treats crime as interrelated with
the social and cultural systems of the total
society. This is the basic assumption in our
analysis of fundamental ideologies and activities of law enforcement, court and correctional
agencies. Criminals are not regarded as an aggregate of abnormal individuals sharply separated from the sociocultural environment
which structures the behavior of noncriminals."
After this general statement, he deals with crime
causation in more detail. He devotes considerable
time to the discussion of Cooley's "formalism" in
institutions, Thomas and Znaniecki's theories of
social disorganization and personality development and Ogburn's theory of cultural lag, with
fresh, but not entirely satisfying, attempts to relate them specifically to crime.
Johnson presents a balanced discussion of
Sutherland's theory of differential association.
Considerable attention is given to the problem of
differential response, in which differential identification, reference group behavior, neutralization
of anti-criminal norms, insulation, anomie and the
integration of conventional deviant values are
treated seriatim as possible explanations of the
fact that people do not respond in the same way to
apparently similar social situations.
A chapter entitled Juvenile Gang Delinquency
encompasses Cohen's theory of delinquent subcultures, Bloch and Niederhoffer's intergenerational tension, Miller's lower class culture, and the
differential opportunity theories of Shaw, Cloward
and Ohlin. A chapter is devoted to social institutions and crime causation. The chapter on patterns
in criminal behavior deals with professional criminals, syndicated crime, white collar crime, and
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murder as a behavior system. Johnson's use of the
term "criminal behavior system" bears only a
superficial resemblance to Sutherland's "behavior
system in crime". It serves as a device for discussing particular types of crime rather than being
a distinctive approach to the analysis of sociological units of criminal behavior.
Johnson organizes his treatment of the administration of justice and the fields of correction
and crime prevention around major ideologies
labelled punitive, therapeutic, and preventive.
The materials on correction are selected from the
practical rather than the theoretical point of view.
Existing practice rather than theoretically oriented
reforms are stressed. There is almost no attention
paid to the current or potential contribution of
sociologists to the field of corrections or crime prevention. Mention must be made of the excellent
discussion of capital punishment, however.
The treatment of these fields by Taft and England is especially well integrated and present
practices are discussed within the framework of
theoretical desirability. This leaves no break between the analysis of causation and treatment or
prevention. Separate chapters on the criminal
law, criminal and juvenile courts, the prison community as a possible socializing agency, and some
progressive systems supplement the traditional
treatment of these fields.
There is a tendency for sociologists to hesitate
in the presentation of their point of view. Durkheim, of course, claimed that crime was normal and
perhaps Sutherland has been most forthright in
stating this sociological position. Behavior of
law-breakers and law-abiders is explainable in
the same way, by the same mechanisms and
processes. It is assumed that there is no differential reaction to circumstances which is peculiar
to the "criminal" as such. Of course there are
"disturbed" law breakers as well as "disturbed"
law-abiders, but this does not explain adequately
the complex phenomena of human behavior. The
way in which any individual behaves has a history
and a setting. Just as the nature of the invention is
determined by the cultural base rather than by the
peculiar individuality of the inventor, so the
criminal act may very well be more closely related
to the social group and its norms than to the idiosyncrasies of the group member.
I would agree with Sutherland that personal
traits and social characteristics are more important
in determining particular associations than they
are in determining specific types of activity.
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Neither Taft and England nor Johnson take such
a forthright position. The former see most crimes
as patterned activity and seek the origin of these
patterns within the context of American society,
but they still are somewhat ambivalent about the
psychiatric and psycho-analytic approaches. Johnson is concerned about the problem of differential
response and while discussing the prison as a
therapeutic community emphasizes the role of the
social worker rather than the sociologist.
ATsTiN VAN DER SLICE

The American University
RACKETViLLE, SLMTmOWN, HAULBURG: AN ExPLoRAT ORY STUDY

OF

D LiNQuENT
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By Irving Spergel. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp. xxiv, 211.
$5.00.
Contemporary sociological theories of deviant
behavior, though widely accepted, are rarely
tested. They perhaps last longer that way.
There may be other reasons for their survival,
however. The theories generally are formulated
so that their operationalization is discretionary for
investigators. Failure of any investigation to support the theory balances in favor of the theorist;
the operationalization was inadequate. But the
burden of failure may not lie altogether with the
investigator, burdensome though that role may
be, as this study amply demonstrates.
The investigation under review is intended as a
test of the Cloward-Ohlin formulation of delinquent subculture theory. The author, working
under the guidance of Ohlin, sought to ". . . focus
on the specific neighborhood conditions which
appear to give rise to discernibly distinct delinquent subcultures." (p. xii.) The techniques of
social observation and a survey of adolescents in
three areas of New York City (Racketville, Slumtown, and Haulburg) provide the data for the investigation.
The Cloward-Ohlin formulation posits three
ideal types of delinquent subcultures-criminal,
conflict, and retreatist. Spergel maintains that
evidence is lacking for a unitary normative organization as a criminal subculture. Rather he sees
two rather distinct subcultures, racket and theft.
In a preface, Spergel describes the racket subculture as ".... the most sophisticated and criminal of all delinquent subcultures." (p. xii.) He
views it as originating ". . . within a social context
in which legitimate opportunities are limited but
illegitimate opportunities are amply available."
TURES.

(p. xv.) The theft subculture "... grows out of a
social condition in which there are particularly
limited conventional and criminal opportunities
to achieve success goals." (p. xvi.) There are then
both legitimate and illegitimate opportunities for
success, thereby, the author argues, eliminating
the need for gang fighting and organized conflict
as the means to success.
The conflict subculture is regarded as a response
to social conditions that are extremely deprivational and both legitimate and illegitimate opportunities for success are generally lacking. The
youth provide their own status system, in this
case, through conflicts among groups that lead
to the establishment of a "rep".
Spergel concludes there is no distinct retreatist
subculture. Rather, drug-use is a variant of each
of the three forms of delinquent subculture. Drug
use, he suggests, is a late adolescent or young
adult response to age-role and social class pressures when they no longer find the subculture a
viable mode of satisfaction and as yet have not
scaled their aspirations to those of the adult
world. Drugs, he contends, in this period of transition help to ". . . sustain still unrealized and unrealizable aspirations to wealth, prestige, or power
developed during the early adolescent years." (p.
xviii.)
This brief summary should make clear that the
investigator's primary concern is to delineate kinds
of delinquent norms and show how they derive
from normative and organizational differences
among neighborhoods in a large city. On completing the book, the reader may want to agree
with Ohlin when he says in a foreword to the volume: "As one reads this book, the conviction
grows that from a sufficiently detailed picture of a
neighborhood system of learning and performance
opportunities and its accessibility to youth, one
could successfully predict the content of the dominant youth subcultures that would emerge."
(p. viii.) Or one may conclude, as has this reviewer that given the relative lack of attention to
conceptual clarity, operationalization of concepts,
and inferences from data, the investigation poses
problems rather than answers questions. There
is room here for only a brief excursion into these
problems.
The general thesis of this work is that delinquent subcultures arise among the lower classes
as forms of response to the integration existing
in the neighborhood in which the gang is located,
specifically to legitimate and illegitimate oppor-
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tunities. Though the study is replete with failures from Slumtown were considerably less oriented
in comparative design, sampling, statistical in- to criminal or illegitimate norms and values
ference and even social observation, the main than were delinquents from Racketville....
shortcomings probably lie in the theory itself. Delinquents from Slumtown were far less oriented
For the statement of the theory makes its opera- to careers in the rackets than were delinquents in
tionalization difficult. The main concepts in the Racketville ...(This does not obviate the fact
that there were many criminals including rackettheory are delinquent subculture, neighborhood,
lower class and availability of legitimate and ille- eers in the neighborhood. They were in the low
gitimate opportunities. These concepts create echelons of the criminal hierarchy, however, and
enormous problems for the investigator, problems possessed relatively little power or influence.)"
that he never resolves.
(p. 47.)
Spergel defines "delinquent subculture" as
Spergel also observes that while drug users have
"...a system of values, norms, and beliefs that to engage in almost daily criminal activity to get
condition the behavior of young people who drugs, they are less criminal in orientation by his
seriously violate the desirable modes of conduct index and not as career-oriented toward crime.
prescribed by official community agents and by
In the Cloward-Ohlin formulation organized
the broader culture in which they live." (p. crime is most criminal. This may seem somewhat
xiii.) The theory is not very helpful in providing confusing since in Racketville gambling is one of
explicit criteria for differentiating among the the main forms of what they define as racketeering. Given the ambiguous normative status of
subcultures though the investigator, like Cloward
gambling in American Society, it is not clear why
and Ohlin, establishes a hierarchy of "criminal"
values and establishes a criminal subculture that organized gambling is more criminal than some
is by definition "most criminal". This leads to other forms of crime. Indeed it is not clear why
some interesting excursions in reasoning about in American Society, sociologists persist in accepting the law enforcement definition of organized
facts.
Discussing the results for the value-norm index, crime as most criminal. Is it because it is more
systematic in its organization and therefore harder
the investigator finds that:
to control? Is there a recognizable hierarchy of
"The delinquents from Racketville were most
highly criminal in orientation.... Nevercriminal values so that some values are more
theless, an inspection of the data on antisocial
criminal than others? Is it that crime is more
profitable in the rackets? How well do values preactivity did not reveal a greater delinquency
dict to behavior? Can one safely assume that the
rate for delinquents from Racketville than
Racketville boys are more likely to undertake
for those in other areas. In other words there
did not appear to be a strict correlation becriminal careers as adults than the Slumtown boys
tween criminal value orientation and genon the basis of their differences in value orientaeral involvement in delinquent behavior. It
tions? These questions are unanswered, if not
is possible, however, that the criminal value
unanswerable.
orientation of the delinquent from the racket
The concept of neighborhood is given no theosubculture merely made him a likely candiretical definition. Operationally, Racketville is
date for future organized criminal activone, Slumtown four and Haulburg five census
ity." (p. 35.)
tracts. Are these differences in area size a function
Even lacking a criterion for a "strict correla- of neighborhood differences? of subculture diftion," it seems that the author wants to say that ferences? of localization of gang activity? or, of
values rather than behavior are the measure of what?
Lower class likewise suffers from lack of concriminality, particularly when it is believed that
persons verbalizing them live in an area where ceptual clarity. Spergel states that "Lower class
populations are neighborhood bound." And that
organized crime flourishes.
This same perspective of values as "criminal"
"... each of the three neighborhoods studied
and orientation toward a career in the rackets contains a predominantly lower-class population
as more criminal appears in a discussion of Slum. .".He then describes each of the areas in terms
town delinquents, though here values get fused of their "economic and social integration." To
with an organizational definition of "criminal begin with, it is apparent from the footnote in
hierarchy" and "success" in crime. "Delinquents Table 12 that all blue collar occupations are lower
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class! This raises serious questions about what is
meant by occupational opportunity as well as by
lower class. He goes on to tell us that "Racketville
with its racket subculture, probably provided
the most advantageous lower-class economic circumstances." (p. 27.) This does not square with
the data from official public sources as reported in
Tables 1, 2 and 3 of the book. The median family
income per family was higher in all census tracts
of Haulburg than it was in the census tract with
the highest average income in Racketville. This
is also inconsistent with occupational data reported in Table 1. What he may want to say is
that Racketville provided greater economic
opportunity from illegitimate means, i.e., crime
may be more profitable there while Haulburg
residents earn a higher average income through
legitimate economic opportunities. Even that
may not be so, as no data are available to check
that inference and the preface cited above contradicts it. Furthermore, given separation of
place of work from place of residence, it seems
doubtful that economic opportunity is defined
in terms of the activity in the neighborhood,
though it may relate to its consumption there.
Central to the study is the concept of legitimate
and illegitimate opportunities. Yet nothing in the
investigation nor in the theory makes it possible
to classify all neighborhoods in New York or any
other city in terms of the availability of legitimate
and illegitimate opportunities. Without both
conceptual and operational clarification of these
concepts, statements such as the following are
meaningless: "The evidence was clear that delinquents from the racket subculture had most
access to illegitimate and probably to legitimate
means; those from the conflict subculture had very
limited access to means, legitimate and illegitimate; and delinquents from the theft subculture
appeared to have an intermediate range of access
to means." (p. 123.)
Finally, the surprising thing about this book is
that although the major concern was defined as a
demonstration of how differences in delinquent
subcultures arise from neighborhood differences,
in Chapter IV the basic unit of analysis becomes
delinquents and nondelinquents. Levels of analysis
are thereby confused. Again this confusion seems
to stem as much from the theory as from the
analysts handling of it. While part of the theory is
cast in terms of relationships among socially organized units (gangs and neighborhoods) and
cultural units (subcultures), causation is formu-

lated at the level of the psychology of individuals
-individuals who experience "strains" in aspirations and expectations.
This book clearly reflects all of the shortcomings
of a "theory" that makes quite general statements
among classes of variables. From such a formulation it is impossible to know when the evidence
goes against the theory. A good case in point is
found in the data on aspirations and expectations.
Nondelinquents report lower aspirations than
delinquents, but higher expectations. If one takes
the theory seriously and postulates that both delinquent and nondelinquent members of the lower
class are equally blocked in their access to legitimate opportunity structures, then should not the
nondelinquents experience the most strain? Why
aren't they the delinquents?
ALBERT J. REiss, JR.
The University of Michigan
OF A Tnm.
By Henry Williamson. Edited by R. Lincoln
Keiser. Doubleday and Company, Inc., 222 pp.
$4.50.
BEHIND BARs-WrAT A Cm4PLAw SAW IN
ALCATRAZ, FoLsom, Am SAN QUENTIN. By
JuliusA. Leibert with Emily Kingsbery. Doubleday and Company, Inc., 223 pp. $4.50.
These books represent an interesting contrast
in orientation towards problems of crime and corrections. The first is the autobiography of a thief,
well adjusted and comfortable in his acceptance of
a way of life meaningful in terms of his experience
and socialization. The second is the reaction of a
well-meaning and sensitive soul who without
theoretical orientation is cast into a jungle of
maximum security prisons with responsibility of
ministering to the spiritual needs of individuals
whose backgrounds are diverse and alien to him.
One represents an attempt to understand criminal
behavior as a natural outgrowth of a socialization
process, and the other as sinful acts of sick individuals or violation of arbitrary man-made
statutes. Both reflect reactions to tradition and
authoritarian control, one by the culprit, and the
other by the reformer. Neither, however, show
understanding of social processes by the authors,
although one is well interpreted in terms of
anthropological theory.
HUSTLER, as the autobiography of a thief,
should be of interest to all concerned with problems of crime and treatment. It is of special interest because it represents an attempt to utilize
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anthropological knowledge and research techniques in the examination of a segment of our own
culture. Anthropologists are usually pictured as
people who go to remote areas seeking out preliterate societies as objects of study. Students who
have been immersed in middle class values and
morality frequently fail to recognize the existence
of indigenous subcultures as foreign to their conception as the culture of a remote society.
This book was compiled and edited by an
anthropology student who, as a caseworker for
the Illinois Cook County, Department of Public
Aid, encountered an alien and strange way of life
in a Negro slum area. He established rapport with
a parolee from the Illinois State Penitentiary who
over a period of time related his life story which
was taped and edited. Before the project was completed, Henry, the subject was again in the penitentiary. The bulk of the book is Henry's own life
story which constitutes a case history of lower
class Negro urban criminality. The book is concluded by an excellent, interpretive commentary
by Dr. Paul Bohannon, professor of anthropology
at Northwestern University.
This reviewer is well aware of pitfalls in gathering and interpretating case history materials. The
autobiography presents special problems in the
coloration supplied by the narrator, and in conscious and unconscious withholding, exaggerating
and otherwise distorting of facts and events. Mr.
Keiser does not reveal the controls he used in
gathering and editing this material, or whether an
attempt was made at verification. Despite these
problems, the autobiographical approach has been
a valuable tool in study of criminal subcultures,
as evidenced by the work of Clifford Shaw and
Sutherland's PRoFEsslOiAL THmF.

This reviewer has almost daily contact with
individuals like Henry in the prison setting. His
story is engrossing reading and has a tone of
authenticity. We are frequently told with candor
equal to that of Henry that the subject has been
making his way by "hustling." These activities
are many and varied, but all are either outright
illegal or only quasi-legal. Correctional workers
may wonder why inmates revert so readily to
criminal activity after they have had the benefit
of such supposedly rehabilitative programs as
vocational or academic training, counselling,
personality orientation courses, religious services,
and the like. Henry supplies the crux of the
answer-this is his way of life, well established
through a natural process of development in what
Dr. Bohannon termed a "warrior subculture."
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Henry's view of jail and prison is revealing. He
fit readily into inmate subculture because its
values and morality was such that he was well
equipped to cope with it. The incarceration experience merely reinforced criminal attitudes
already well established. His response to educational opportunity was much the same as earlier
evidenced in the public school. The prison school
was a soft assignment, a place to avoid work. The
prison environment was a setting where one could
connive, subtly manipulate, and otherwise defeat
the purposes of the administration and ease the
pains of confinement. Henry states, however, that
prison changed him. "I was evil when I got out. I
just didn't care about nothin! Prison did that to
me. Before I wasn't like this, but after I just
didn't care."
Henry was discharged at expiration of sentence
and inasmuch as incarceration had produced no
favorable changes and no provision was made for
reorientation into conventional areas of society,
he returned as one would expect to his previous
environment and pattern of life. As is pointed out
in the commentary, Henry's subsociety provided
no legitimate or satisfactory niche for a twentyyear old youth who was already "pushing his
time in the warrior grade." He progressed in a
pattern of more persistent and serious aggressive
crime which culminated in serious injury and
partial paralysis when he was shot in a robbery
attempt and returned to prison.
The conceptualization that Henry is a natural
product of a normal socialization process is compatible with recent criminological theory. Yet
professional people in education, religion, law and
corrections, who for the most part are middle class
in background and orientation, continue to view
the Henrys of our time as isolated individuals who
persist in criminality through rational choice,
mental quirks, ignorance, or just plain stubborness. We often act as if we do not realize that it
is just as foolish to deal with these Henrys as
isolated units as it would be to try to understand
fish without reference to water. The book is recommended because of insights derived from the
anthropological approach and the resultant glimpse
into this strange segment of our own culture.
BEHIND BA-ts is written by a Jewish Chaplain

who for a period of time served the Federal Penitentiary at Alcatraz, and the California prisons
of Folsom and San Quentin. The book is a readable compilation of anecdotes, parables, sermonettes, lay comments on crime and punishment,
lamentations of a frustrated rabbi advised to
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"stick to the spiritual", references to well-known
inmates, such as Morton Sobell and Caryl Chessman, and arguments for abandonment of prisons.
The reader should keep in mind that the author,
who had served as an army chaplain, is judging
on the basis of experience only within the maximum
security facilities mentioned above. One might
wonder whether he would view the California
correctional system with quite as jaundiced an
eye if his initiation had been in other segments of
the California system. The only mention of contact with other facilities is in regard to occasional
trips to the Deuel Vocational Institution, a medium
security prison. The broad scope of the California
system and its professional staffing is ignored.
Character sketches of inmates are reminiscent
of Wilson's My Six CoNVIcTs. The author's conception of prison subculture is based on verbalizations from the type of "con-wise" inmate who
gravitate into coveted assignments, such as that
of chaplain's clerk. He does not appear to realize
the extent to which he himself is "conned" and
manipulated and made to view the prison from
inmate bias.
The rabbi's criminological theory is equally
naive. He fails to see the offender as a culturally
produced phenomenon such as Henry, the "Hustler." He sets up a dichotomy of criminal acts:
"malum per se", or universal evil, and "malum
prohibitum", or arbitrary man-made law. "Malum
per se" offenders are sick individuals, psychotics
or psychopaths, and the suggested solution is
psychiatric treatment in facilities other than
penal. "Malum prohibitum" violators are viewed,
not as criminals, but law-breakers to be handled,
not by prisons, but by rehabilitation centers.
"Trained Counsellors shall be in charge, not
guards; brothers of mercy, not jailors; people
qualified to help develop character and talent, not
wardens. Guidance, not custody will be the paramount concern." The latter approach is of course
compatible with trends in corrections. What to do
with psychopaths not amenable to psychiatric
therapy, and with persistant law breakers dangerous to life and property, if not subjected to
external controls, is not indicated in this book.
This reviewer recommends this book for all who
are interested in the problems and frustrations of
idealistic correctional workers. The humanitarianism of the author is admirable, his empathy
with inmates is commendable, his indignation with
the failure and limitation of the penal approach
is understandable, but his lack of scientific knowledge of dynamics of human behavior, theoretical

content of criminology, and developments in corrections is lamentable. The book is revealing in
many ways, but scarcely merits the jacket description of "one of the most important works of
prison literature ever written."
Despite contrasts between these books, there
is a basic similarity. Both are autobiographies;
one of a thief, the other of a humanitarian who
would rehabilitate thieves. Rabbi Leibert's life
story is projected back to his childhood in a
Lithuanian ghetto and to his experience and education as a member of a persecuted minority. One
life story is anthropologically interpreted, the
other presented without objective interpretation.
Why should not the same tools of analysis be applied to the corrector as to the one to be corrected? Only in this way can we gain a wholistic
picture of corrections which involves an intricate
interplay of roles and personality types within an
institutional setting.
HAxorLn S. FRum, PH.D.
Division of the Criminologist
Illinois Department of Public Safety
UTopiATEs: THE USE AND UsERs or LSD-25. By
Richard Blum and Associates. New York: The
Atherton Press, 1964, pp. 303, $8.00.
The main portion of the book consists of the
Blums' account of their study of 92 LSD users,
their comments on the use of this drug in an institutional setting, their findings with respect to
the attitudes of 31 policemen toward LSD and
other drugs, and their general reflections upon the
advantages and, to a lesser extent, disadvantages
of LSD use. Among the other contributors to this
collection of papers are three psychologists, two
physicians, a pharmacologist, a policeman, and a
chaplain. In two chapters, the Zihuatanejo,
Mexico, "Experiment in Transpersonative Living" is discussed.
The principal findings of the Blums were that
LSD use is primarily confined to mental-health
professionals and persons associated with these
professionals as patients, students, experimental
volunteers, colleagues or relatives. These users of
LSD were "respected, conforming, successful
persons with socially favored backgrounds and
careers."
The effect of LSD upon the subjects' behavior
was reported to be primarily dependent upon the
social characteristics of the users and the immediate environmental conditions under which the
drug was taken-whether religious, transcendental
or hedonistic. Although a few subjects had adverse
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behavioral reactions following use of LSD and
some were displeased with its psychic effect, most
users were favorably impressed with the drug,
expressed an interest in taking it again and all
of the regular users were proselytizers as well.
The book includes, in addition to the study
findings, a considerable discussion of the "LSD
Movement." The chapters written by the Blums,
and the one by Leary, Alpert and Metzner, advocate the non-medical use of LSD as a partial
solution for the evils of contemporary society-the
world has become bureaucratic and "humility and
brotherly love are gone." An answer is suggested
by Richard Blum in the last page of the book:
"The movement promises much-a return to
paradise, a utopia of the inner life-and so LSD-25
becomes, if one may be allowed a neologism, a
'Utopiate'."
Utopiates may be appraised from a medical,
philosophic or scientific point of view. Although
there are important questions of medical ethics
involved and the moral and philosophic questions
raised are often interesting, it seems most appropriate to consider the book as an objective study
of LSD users inasmuch as the editor regards the
book as a research report.
In this light-with the notable exception of the
chapters presented by the two physicians, the
pharmacologist, and the police administrator-the
book is not objective. While the Blums and their
associates may well be commended for undertaking a study in which LSD users were interviewed
in the community, the inadequacy (or absence) of
the research design, the bias of the interviewers,
and the continual intrusion of extraneous and prejudicial opinions upon the reporting and analysis
of findings severely restrict the validity of the data
presented. Thus, other investigators have not
found it difficult to obtain interviews from drug
users without being tempted to join the subject
group. And it is yet to be demonstrated that the
validity of a scientific experiment is determined
by whether or not the investigator has subjected
himself to the stimulus, as some LSD users maintain. (The content of this review may or may not
be affected by whether or not the reviewer has
used LSD-25.)
JoHN C. BALL
Chief, Sociology Unit
Addiction Research Center
U.S. Public Health Service Hospital
Lexington, Kentucky
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PEDOPIMLA AND ExfrninIomst. By J. W. Mohr,
R. E. Turner and M. B. Jerry. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964, pp. xvi + 204,
$8.75.
The authors have all been associated with the
Forensic Clinic of the Toronto Psychiatric Hospital and with the Department of Psychiatry at
the University of Toronto. Since they are a
psychiatric social worker, a psychiatrist and a
clinical psychologist, they constitute a true team,
which is now customary in hospitals and clinics.
The authors state that their studies were
"focused on the natural history of the deviations
(of sex) and their consequences as expressed by the
data (they) were able to collect." They also state
that their orientation "was strictly empirical and
the method used was that of a phenomenological
enquiry." Unfortunately, the term was left undefined.
The study covers all patients referred to the
Clinic by the Courts or related legal agencies
(police, probation, legal counsel) from April 1956
to July 1959, who were diagnosed as pedophiles,
exhibitionists or homosexuals. These amounted to
132 cases: 55 pedophiles, 54 exhibitionists, and 23
homosexuals; nine were put into two or all of the
three categories. Three procedures were followed:
(1) a follow-up which was mainly concerned with
the criminal records before and after referral to the
Clinic, (2) an analysis of case records in which "all
the material accumulated on these cases was
analysed," and (3) a personal follow-up which included those patients who were treated at the
clinic and had finished their treatment at least one
year prior to this follow-up. I have listed these
procedures, practically in the authors' own
language, as it seems to me that the reader ought
to be aware of the type of study the authors undertook, and the rather severe limitations the authors
set for themselves. After much laborious analysis
of primarily statistical (not clinical) data, the
authors reach such conclusions as that "exhibitionism has consistently the highest rate of
recidivism among sexual offenders," a conclusion
to which I have come in my practice without having made any special study. The literature which
the authors have chosen is not well proportioned,-the non-psychiatric, and particularly the nonanalytic, literature far outweighing the psychiatric
literature (even though the authors are members of
a psychiatric clinic). Freud is mentioned in the
bibliography, and only once in the text. Few of the
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sources stem from the fifties, hardly any from the
sixties. The sociologist will have a field day with
the numerous appendices, which present statistical
data collected by the authors.
Especially disappointing for the beginning
student as well as the experienced practitioner is
the authors' failure to describe methods of treatment. Four short paragraphs are devoted to
"motivation of treatment," to me one of the most
important factors in treating sex deviates. If one
were to make deductions as to the authors' work
with these deviates, he might think that the length
of treatment has little relationship to the motivation of the patients. About individual treatment
the authors are content to cite other authors, almost insulting the reader's intelligence with three
short paragraphs on the subject, just as group
psychotherapy is treated in three paragraphs,
again primarily reviewing the work of others.
There is no doubt that the paraphilias (so
named by Karpman, whose work was cut short by
his untimely death a few years ago) deserve more
attention. Many professional workers, both inside
and outside of the correctional field, would appreciate a book that described the dynamics of
sexual deviations and the process of treatment in
an adequate way. This book is not one of them.
HANs A. ILLING
DEIQUENCY Am DR. By David Matza. New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964. pp. x, 199.
$4.95.
Professor Matza begins his book by contrasting
the classical school of criminology, which emphasizes crivie in relation to the legal structure,
with the positive school, which looks at the criminal actor in an effort to discover the causes of
criminal behavior. The science of behavior is based
upon a principle of determinism. The classical
school emphasized free will, and Professor Matza
retains the element of free will and choice in his
concept of "soft determinism."
The writer then reviews the current literature
on the sociology of delinquency, which follows the
positivistic tradition, and he concludes that "In
the most influential expressions of contemporary
sociological theory of delinquency, beliefs are the
key independent variable". (p. 19) The sociologist
"posits a set of intervening beliefs which shape
the behavior of delinquents." (p. 25)
The theories of Cohen, Cloward, Ohlin, and
Miller view delinquency as in opposition to con-

ventional middle class values and norms. Professor Matza rejects the notion that alienation
and opposition exist between delinquent values
and conventional values. The theory of drift
presented herein states that the delinquent drifts
between conventional and criminalistic values and
norms. The theory of drift preserves both freedom
and control, since the delinquent can respond to
some norms and not to others. As evidence of
drift, the writer points to the fact that a person
can belong to a delinquent gang and be exempted
from delinquent acts because of special circumstances such as school or employment. The delinquent will rationalize his behavior according
to the circumstances. The delinquent belongs to
a subculture of delinquency, and not to a delinquent subculture. In the subculture of delinquency there is a balance between convention
and crime, and the subcultural system is integrated with the conventional order. Delinquents
are not committed to delinquency, though this
misconception is fostered by the belief that delinquents are committed to criminal values.
The criminal law creates and supports neutralization behavior on the part of the delinquent.
The negation of intent and blameworthiness by
infancy, insanity, and self defense gives to the delinquent a value system for rationalizing his behavior. Social welfare agencies attached to juvenile
courts foster a sense of injustice by telling the delinquent that he is not responsible for his act. The
blame is placed upon the family, the community,
gangs, and poverty.
Professor Matza has stated that to understand
the delinquent we must understand the environment in which he lives and the influence of that
environment upon behavior. He is critical of
sociologists who use beliefs as the crucial intervening variable in explaining behavior. Neopositivistic criminology has led to the view that delinquency is caused by (or is correlated with)
beliefs and attitudes. By introducing the mind
into his explanation of behavior the criminologist
has made mentalistic statements which are beyond
empirical proof, since no one has ever seen a belief
or attitude. Professor Matza makes an excellent
start in refuting the positivistic notion that
criminal behavior must be explained in terms of
individual processes (be they sociological, psychological, or biological). However, Professor
Matza becomes mentalistic and positivistic when
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he explains behavior in terms of neutralization and
rationalization.
Neutralization refers to verbal statements made
to police officers and social workers by delinquents.
Verbal behavior is behavior which is dependent
upon the environment in which it occurs. A delinquent tells one story to a probation officer and
another to his fellow delinquent because the consequences are different in the two situations. There
is little or no evidence that the belief system of the
delinquent as expressed in his verbal behavior is a
cause of his delinquent behavior. A delinquent
steals an automobile for one reason, he talks about
his stealing behavior for other reasons. These are
two different categories of behavior under the
control of different environmental contingencies.
The theory of neutralization presented in this book,
and developed by Sykes and Matza earlier in a
paper, assumes that mental processes cause or are
related to behavior. "I have stressed throughout
the connection between delinquent thought and the
ideas and practices that pervade contemporary
juvenile law." (Preface, emphasis added.) Professor Matza views neutralization as a mental or

cognitive process, thereby translating verbal behavior into a mental process. This mind-body
dualism which is basic to most sociological theorizing is open to critical examination on methodological grounds since mental processes are known or
inferred from behavior.
Professor Matza has made a valuable statement
in his criticism of current theorizing on delinquent
behavior. However, he falls into the same methodological issues and errors as those he criticizes. He is
on solid ground when he deals with the influence of
community agencies on delinquent behavior. When
the juvenile court excuses delinquent behavior,
or a social worker blames the parents for such behavior, these agencies are rewarding the delinquent
for behaving in a given way. Professor Matza
could have dealt with the various ways in which
social agencies shape and maintain delinquent behavior without resorting to any theory of neutralization. However, it would not be in the tradition of modern sociological thinking.
C. R. JEFFERY
Washington School of Psychiatry
Washington, D.C.

BOOK NOTE
T=~. By Yale Kamisar,
Fred E. Inbau, and Thurman Arnold. The University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville, Va.
1965. Pp. 169. $1.75.
This is a trilogy of three essays on pressing and
controversial problems raised by judicial decisions
of recent years. The first essay is by Yale Kamisar,
Professor of Law at the University of Michigan. It
C=nuNAL JTsTIcE iN OuR

is entitled Equal Jitstice in the Gatehouse and
Mansions of Amrican Criminal Procedure: From
Powell to Gideon, from Escobedo to.... The second
is on Law Enforcement, The Courts, and Individual
Ciail Liberties by Fred E. Inbau, Professor of
Law at Northwestern University. The third is The
Criminal Trial as a Synbol of Public Morality by
Thurman Arnold of the District of Columbia Bar.

